RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES.
The case of Bradley Engineeering & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn et al.,
io6 Pac. R. i7o (Wash. i91o) held that one apparently a joint maker
of a note could not show as a defense under section
58 of the Ncgotiable Instruments Act in an action
extension of
thereon by a holder for value that he signed as accomTimses
ae
n
uey
ihu
consideration,
without
surety,
and
modation maker
Accommoda.
tion Maker
which plaintiff knew. The defenses referred to in
that section are only such as are permitted by the
act or such equities as do not deny the tenor of the
bill; a holder for value being in the same position as one in due
course as to such defense. Anderson y. Mitchell, 5! Vash. 265, The
court further held that being primarily liable as an accommodation
maker, appellant was not discharged by an extension of time to the
principal debtor. Vanderford v. Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank,
1o5 Md. 164; tWolstenholne v. Smith 34 Utah, 300; Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Or., 186. The grounds of these decisions are, that one who is
a maker, is absolutely required to pay the note and therefore such a
maker even though for accommodation, has assumed a primary liability, and is not relieved from liability by an extension of time of payment without his knowledge or consent.
Before the advent of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the general
law in the United States was that where a note is signed by one
of the parties as accommodation maker, and the holder, with knowledge of that fact, grants the principal maker an extension of time,
without the consent of'the accommodation maker, the latter is discharged.
For a criticism of the wisdom of the change in the law necessitated by the act, and on the question whether the proper interpretation of the act does demand such change, see 56 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, 341 (i9o8).
Affirming in general the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. (1762)
Held, the exception to the rule there laid down by Lord Mansfield is well established, that if the holder of a bill or
Recovery of
check himself has been guilty of negligence in purMoney Paid
chasing it or acquiring possession of it by failing to
require identification of the payee who transferred the
S gnatre of
paper, that then the drawee who has honored a check
Bank De.
positor
for the holder may recover the amount so paid in
assumpsit, on discovery of the forgery of the drawer's
signature with due notice and demand; provided the drawee has not
himself been at fault in the matter of honoring a signature not in fact
that of his depositor, e. g., in having at hand no standard signature for
purposes of comparison. Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County
Bank. 66 S. E. (W. Va. 1go9) 761.
The doctrine of the early English case that after acceptance or
1324.
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RECENT CASES

439

BILLS AND NOTES (Continued).
payment, the drawee is estopped from denying the validity of the
drawer's signature has met with general approval and as stated, is rec-•

ognized law. 2 Daniels' Neg.Inst. § 1655. The courts of North Dakota
stand practically alone in refusing to recognize the case as .sound. The
rule in that state is that the drawee may, upon discovery of the forg-

ery, recover the money paid from the party who received it, though a
holder in good faith, provided the latter has not been misled or
prejudiced by the drawee's failure to detect the forgery. First National

Bank v. Bank of Vvndnicre, ioS N. W. (N. D. igo6) 546.
Where the question of recovery of money paid on a forged drawer's
signature has involved a bank as drawee, the obvious possibilities
of working frequent injustice :o the drawee-bank under the general
rile. because of carrying modern business and banking customs has
impelled the courts to set up an exception. Such expection is stated in the
kading American case: the responsibility of the drawee who pays
a forged check, for the genuineness of the drawer's signature is
absolute only in favor of one who has not by his own fault or negligence contributed to the success of the fraud or to mislead the drawee.
National Bank-of North America of Boston v. Bangs, io6 Mass. (870'
44T, 8 Am.Rep. 349. What constitutes contributing fault or negligence
of the holder may depend upon many circumstances. Those circumstances are stated to be when, either by express agreement or a
settled course of business between the parties, or by a general custom
in the place and applicable to the business, the holder takes upon himself the duty of exercising some material precaution to prevent the
fraud. Ellis v. Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co. 4 Ohio St. 628
Such precaution inter alia, is the general custom prevailing
(IS55).
in the banking business, when a check is presented by a stranger, to
a bank other than that upon which it is drawn, to make inquiries in
reference to his right to the check and his identity. Idein; First
National Bank v. Reeker, 7r f1l. 439. In view of such custom, a bank
which has accepted a transfer of a check and become a holder under
such circumstances, in presenting it to the drawee-bank, authorizes
the latter to assume this precaution has been taken, and to pay the
check on such assumption. And if in fact the precaution has not been
taken, and the drawee-bank pays the check without knowledge of the
forgery, it may on discovery, recover the amount so paid. Canadian
Bank of Commerce v. BinghaM, 71 Pac. (Wash. 1903) 43; 60 L R.
A. 955; Ford & Co. v. People's Bank of Orangeburg, 54 S. E. (S. C,
igo6) 204.
The chief question as to the soundness of this line of reasoning
to support the exception, is whether a drawee bank does in fact
rely, in judging of the authenticity of its depositors' signatures, upon
the fact that the bank presenting the checks has made inquiry as to
the identity and right of its transferror, or does the drawer bank
credit its correspondents with the checks which pour into it each
day and rely only upon the ability of its own officials to discover those
forgeries with the detection of which it is charged? Moreover, granting an affirmative answer to the first question, does even the most
positive identification of the original holder of the check by the presenting bank have any legitimate and certain tendency to prove the
drawer's signature is not forged? Suppose, as was the fact in the
principal case. that the original holder was himself the forger, he could
readily secure identification, and the requirement thereof by the intermediary bank, which had no knowledge of the drawer's signature,

RECENT CASES

BILLS AND NOTES (Continued).
would prove nothing as to the existence of a forgery. Therefore, it
is submitted that reliance by the drawee bank upon the requirement of
identification of the original holder by the other bank, which has no
probative value as to the forgery, should not relieve the drawee of
the obligation to know its drawer's signature. In other words, the
neglect by the intermediary of its customary duty to require identification, is not the natural and probable cause of the damage, which
results from the drawer's failure to detect the forgery.
Another exception to the doctrine of Price v. Neal is urged forcibly
by eminent text writers on the subject. Mr. Daniels says, "when-the
bank discovers the forgery immediately, and demands restitution,
offering to return the check, before the hohler has lost anything by
regarding the matter as all right, we cannot help thinking it should
I,c allowed to recover the money back." 2 Daniels Neg. Inst. § 165ja.
And 2 Parsons W. & B. go, supports the same view, favoring the
recovery of money so paid if the person to whom it was paid was at
fault, or, being innocent, would then he in no worse condition than if
the drawee bank had originally discovered the forgery and refused
honor to the check. There is much to be said for the wisdom and
justice of this exceptibn to the hard and rigorous doctrine of the
English leading case, as applied to banks and checks. The doctrine is
itself an exception to the more general rule that money paid under
mistake of fact may be recovered. As an exception it should not
be extended. Under the view urged above, it would not apply where
the refusal to apply it will cause no loss to the bank or banker who
has received the money paid. If he is called on to refund, he will
be in no worse position than if the drawee bank had at once refused
payment. That is, he is still in a position to recover over from his
trarisferror or has as yet, made no settlement with the latter. This is
in accord with the general rule that there should be no estoppel where
the conduct upon which it is based has cauqed no loss or damage.
Still a third view, refusing to apply the doctrine of Price v. Neal
to certain cases where the bank or person presenting the paper has
indorsed it. raises an exception based upon the supposed ground that
the indorsement is a gtaranty of the genuineness of the signatures on
the instrument. See 56 University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
122, where it is argued that such an indorsement is not a true indorseinent in law, but a receipt, and so without a warrant, and that therefore, the exception is not supportable. However, granting the indorsesient may be a guaranty, if the drawee. after acceptance or payment. is
estopped from denying the validity of the drawer's signature, can he
be heard to allege the breach of guaranty, proof of which is, through
his right to show the forgery, a right he has lost by payment?
See on the general topic, 33 American Law Review 4r1 (1875);
"The Doctrine of Pricev. Neal:"4 Harv. L R. 297.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
On a trial for rape, the making and enforcement of an order
excluding all persons from the courtroom (after the jury was impanelled, and until the argument to the jury commenced)
except "all jurors, officers of the court, including attorRight to
Public Trial
neys. litigants, and their attorneys. witnesses for both
parties, and any other person or persons whom the several parties to the action may request to remain," was assigned as

RECENT CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
error in the case of State v. Nyhius, 124 N. W. (N. D.) 71, 19W. The
defendant contended that this action of the trial court deprived him
of his constitutional right to a "speedy and public trial."
The court held that these constitutional provisions were enacted
to make it forever impossible for public prosecutors or courts to continre the evils of secret tr;als as they formerly existed; and that
"public trials" in the literal sense of those words have never beei
construed to be granted by these provisions. Therefore courts may,
where indecent and immoral acts are to be detailed, limit the attendante at trials so far as young persons are concerned, and so far as
othlers are concerned, if the defendant's friends and those whom he
or the counsel request to be present are permitted to attend, if they
desire. Accord: Jackson v. Co)".. 38 S. St. (Ky.) 422; State v. Callahan,
ioo Minn. 63; People v. S-wafford, 3 Pac. (Cal.) o. See also Cooley
on Const. Lim. (6th ed.) p. 372 and Bishop on Criminal Procedure

§ 959.

In Abb. Tr. Br. Cr. (2nd ed.) p. i6o, the rule is thus stated. (1)
The requirement of public trial is fairly met if, without partiality or
favoritism, a reasonable number of the public are admitted, notwithstanding that many whose presence would be of no service to the
accused, and who would only be drawn thither by idle curiosity, are
excluded altogether. (2) The exclusion by the court of all persons
other than those interested in the case, where, from the character of
the charge and nature of the evidence, public morality would be
injuriously affected does not violate the right to a public trial.
The order of the court in People v. Murray, 5o N. St. (Mich.)
995 excluding all from the courtroom except "respectable citizens,"
(which order resulted in causing the exclusion of a number of attorneys and other citizens) was held to be too restrictive and consequently furnished proper grounds for the granting of a new trial. See
also People v. Hartman, 37 Pac. (Cal.) 153 and State v. Henslcy, 79 N.
E. (Ohio) 462.

CRIMES.
In Betts v. Stevens, i K. B. (9x1o) two constables were stationed
at the end of an automobile trap with stop watches for the purpose of
detecting and securinF evidence of breaches of the Motor
Car Act 19o3. Certain cars belonging to the Automobile
Obstructing
Association on approaching the trap, had bden running
Oticer:
at an excessive rate of speed. The appellant, who was
Automobile
a sergeant of the Association, gave signals to the drivers
Trap
of the cars that there wvas a trap ahead. The speed
of the cars was then reduced so that when they entered
the trap they were running within the statutory rate of speed of twenty
miles per hour. Stevens. one of the officers on duty, laid an information against the appellant for having unlawfully obstructed a police
officer in the discharge of his duty, contrary to the Prevention of Crimes
Amendment Act (48 & 49 Vict. c. 75, s. 2).

The Judges below were

of the opinion that the appellant had so obstructed the officer in the
execution of his duty and convicted him. In dismissing the appeal the
court distinguished Bastable v. Little, (19o7) I K. B. 59, on the ground
that the evidence in that case did not disclose the fact that the cars
were being run at a rate of speed in excess of the statutory limit at
the time the signal was given as was proven in the present case. There
the court refused to draw the conclusion that they must have been
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breaking the law from the fact that the rate of speed was reduced after
the warning was given. Darling, J., drew the further disijnction that
the act of the appellant was done not for the purpose of procuring
observance of the law, but with the intent to enable the drivers of
the cars to avoid arrest by keeping within the statutory limit at the
only point where evidence against them could be obtained. The act
"was not done in order to assist the officers in the execuion of their
duty, nor to prevent a motorist from committing an offense, but to the
end that the drivers should escape arrest; after that danger was removed
it was immaterial to the appellant what rate of speed was maintained.
The gist of the offense lay in the intention with which it was done.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
An interesting question of criminal procedure arose in the case of
Enson v. The State, so So. (Florida) 948 (1og). The indictment
charged the larceny "of certain bank bilLs and notes,
indictment:
commonly known and denominated as lawful currency
Variance
of'the United States. of divers denominatiors. the number and denomination of which are to the prosecutor
unknown, and certain silver specie, a more particular description of
which is to the prosecutor unknown." The evidence showed that the
person from whom they were taken knew the precise denominations,
and therefore the prosecuting officer, by the exercise of dre diligence.
could have ascertained them. A request to charge that this constituted
a fatal variance was refused. The Court said, "the indictment states
the denominations to be unknown, the proofs show they could have
been known. Ability to acquire knowledge is not the same thing as
knowledge and there is no variance." Cases are cited in support of
this in Massachusetts, Alabama, New York and some other jurisdictions.
Taylor, J., dissented, holding there was a fatal variance. There
are many jurisdictions which take this view, as the following cases
show: The State v. Stowe, 132 MNo. 199 (i89s); State v. Thompson, 137
Mo. 62o (x1,86) ; Presley v. The State, 24 Tex. App. 494 (1S7); Blodget v. The State, 3 Ind. 403 (1852).
Among the text writers there seems to be some difference of opinion as to which is the better view. On the point of whether it constitutes a variance, it seems hard to disagree with the logic of the Court.
But certainly it was not intended that a prosecuting officer should avoid
describing the property stolen except in case of necessity, which would
not prevail when he could have learned from the owner of the property
exactly what was stolen. Therefore on principle it should constitute a
defect in an indictment.
EQUITY.
An act passed January 2o, z9o9, in Tennessee, prohibited the sale
of intoxicating liquors within four miles of any school house. This
act was construed by the prosecuting officers to prohibit
injunction to sales at wholesale as well as retail. The plaintiffs, who
Criminal
were wholesale distillers and brewers, claiming that the
act applied only to retailers, filed a bill to enjoin the
Action
prosecuting officers from instituting and prosecuting criminal actions against them for sales of liquors, on the ground that they
would be subjected to a multiplicity of prosecutions and suffer irrep-

RECENT CASES

EQUITY (Continued).
arable damage. While the Court did not think that the apprehension
of vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits was made out, they
nevertheless went on to say that it was well settled that courts of
equity had no jurisdiction to entertain a bill to construe a valid criminal
statute, and pending the proceedings, or at their termination, enjoin
prosecution for violation of it. Insurance Co. v. Craig, io6 Tenn. 641;
Grcincr-Kellcy Drug Co. v. Truett, 97 Tex. 380; Arbuckle v. Blackburn,
113 Fed. 625.

The decision expressly limited the power of equity to restrain criminal proceedings to those cases where the proceedings are instituted by
a party to a suit already pending before it, and to try the game right
that is in issue there. Saulle v. Browne, L P. o., Ch. 64; Kerr v.
Preston, 6 Ch. D. 463; Scott v. Smith, 121 N. C. 95; Ewing v. Webster,
io3 Iowa, 226; City of Bainbridge v. Reynolds, iii Ga. 759; Crighton v.
Dahmer, 70 Miss. 6o2; Whiltemore v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 27; Boin, v. Jennings, 107 L. 410; Rhodes v. New Hampshire (C. C.), 70 Fed. 721;
Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 113 Fed. 617.

EVIDENCE.
It was material to the plaintiff's case that the death of an insured
be established at a particular date. The evidence tended to show insured had been unexplainably absent and had not been
Presumption heard of for seven years. The material date fell within
the seven years. feld, There is no presumption that a
of Deati:
Time of Death

person who has been absent for more than seven years

died at any particular date, or before the lapse of the
life insurance policy for non-payment of assessments two or three
months after his disappearance. Bradley v. Modern Woodmen of
Aincrica, 124 S. W. Mo. (i9io) 69.
'Mr. Wigmore says there is a genuine presumption of long standing
and of universal acceptance to aid the proof of death. 4 Evid., see. 2531.
This presumption is of the common law, Thayer Prel. Treat., 319, and
in an indefinite form was recognized by Lord Mansfield in 1763. Rowe
v. ltasland, i W. BI. 404. Its establishment as a fair presumption for
the jury to make is conceded where there has been absence for seven
years front time of last being heard of without later evidence of life.
Doe v. Jesson, 6 East (i8o5), 8o. And see PrudentialAssurance Co. v.
In America the common law preEdwardr, L. R. 2 Q. C. 487 (877).
sumption has been generally recognized. 4 Wigman Evid., supra, notes.
Statutory enactments have even more generally adopted the presumption,
sometimes varying slightly the circumstances necessary to raise it.
- But in accord with the principal case, it is, perhaps, always held
the presumption runs merely to the fact of death from and after the
end of the period. There is no presumption as to the time of death
within that period. Nepean v. Knight, 2 M. & W. (1837) 894; Davie v.
Briggs, 97 U. S. (1878) 628. And if it be material to the success of
either party to show death or life at, before, or after any particular
date within the period of seven years, that party has the burden of
evidencing this. i Greenl. Evid., sec. 41; Flynn v. Coffee, 12 Allen
(Mass.), 204.
Whether from any certain facts proved, the jury will be permitted
to infer death at or before any particular point of time is another question. Such inference, if justifiable, will merely aid the party in discharging the burden just shown to rest upon him. In Davie v. Briggs,
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supra, Mr. Justice Harlan thought that if it appeared in the evidence
that the absent person, within the seven years, encountered some specific peril, or within the period came within the range of some impending or immediate danger, which might reasonably be expected to destroy life, the Court or jury iiight infer that life ceased before the

expiration of the seven years. Therefore. evidence of such circumn-

stances of peril would be admissible. Eagle's Case, 3 Abb. Prac. 218;
Hancock v. Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26.
The principal case, however, expresses the rule of the M1issouri
Courts, adopting the view of several Iowa cases, that evidence of other
import than circumstances of pendifig peril is admissible to justify an
inference by the triers of fact that death occurred at or'before a particular time. In Tisdalc v. Insur. Co., 26 Iowa, i7o, it was held that the
jury might draw the conclusion of death upon proof of any facts,
which according to human experience, made it probable that the party,
if alive, would have communicated with his friends. This doctrine is
adopted in Missouri. Hancock v. Life Ins. Co., supra; Lancaster v.
Insur. Co., 62 Mlo. 121, 128. It proceeds upon this thought taken from

the Iowa case cited: "'Must seven years pass or must it be shown that
liewas last seen or heard of in peril before his death can be presumed?

No greater wrong could be done to the character of a man than tb

account for his absence, even after the lapse of a few short months,

upon the ground of a wanton abandonment of his family and friends.
ie could have lived a good and useful life to but little purpose, if those
who knew him could even entertain such a suspicion."
Thus, though the rule be generally stated, there is"
no presumption of death at any particular time, the jury will be permitted, following absence unexplained, to presume or infer death before the expiration
of seven years, i. e., at or before any particular date within the seven
years, as a general rule, upon proof of circumstances of particular peril

encouritered; and under the Missouri and Iowa rule, also, upon proof
of circumstances creating a probability that, unless dead, the absentee
would have communicated with his family or friends. The probative
method of the latter rule is practically that, because a certain result

does not occur, the absentee cannot be alive.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
A statute provided that "a married woman may bargain, sell, assign, and transfer her separate personal property, and carry an any
trade or business, and perform any labor or services on
her sole and separate account, and alone sue or be sued
Effect 9f [Utr- in the courts of the state on account of said property,
red Woman's business, or services." It was held that this statute did
Property Acts
on Husband's not abolish by implication the common law liability of a
Liability for
husband for the slander of his wife, even though the
Slander of
slanderous words were uttered in his absence and withwife
out his knowledge or consent. Jackson v. Williams, 123
S. W. (Ark.) 751 (1go9).
The liability of the husband at common law for slander by his wife
was undoubted, but the reasons for the doctrine have been variously
given. One was that the unity of husband and wife rendered the latter
incapable of being sued alone. Baker v. Braslin, 16 IL I. 6 35 (1889).
Another was that the husband had entire control over his wife's personal property, receiving all the benefits therefrom, and so ought to be
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liable for her torts. Still another was that because of the great amount
of personal control which a hushand had at that time over his wife,
he should not allow her to commit torts. Martin v. Robeson, 65 Ill.
129 (1872).

As to the effect of the .Married Women's Property Acts on this
common law liability, there is some difference of opinion. A few jurisdictions hold under similar acts, as in our principal case, that the statutc
abrogates the husband's liability. The ground of these decisions is
that since the statute takes away the husband's control over the conduct
and the personal property of his wife, and also permits her to be sued
alone, all the reasons for the common law rule cease, and therefore the
rule itself ought to cease. Martin v. Robeson, 65 Ill..129 (872); Morris v. Corkell, 32 Kan. 409 (1884) ; Lane v. Bryant, Too Ky. 138 (8f6).
But the large majority of jurisdictions are in accord with our principal case. Some of them take the broader view that the fundamental
basis of the old common law rule was the absolute unity of the husband
and wife in the marital relation and not a contractual one based on the
husband's property rights. This unity of relation still exists unaffected
by the statute, and so the'husband should be liable. Fitzgeraldv. Quamni,
Tog N. Y. 441 (1&88) ; Henley v. W1ilson, 137 Cal. 273 (19o2) ; Nichols
V.Xiclhls. 147 Mo. 409 0898). Others assign the more practical reason, that. if the husband be not responsible, the injured party would be
ordinatiiy without remedy, and it would be "permitting one-half of
the adult members of society to slander the other half svith impunity."
Gell v. State, 37 W .Va. 479 (894) ; McElfreesh v. Kirkendall, 36 Ia.
Still others hold that although the rule may have outlived
224 (1873).
its usefulness, it is for the legislature to change it. The Courts cannot
judicially legislate it out of existence. Fowler v. Chichester, 26. Ohio
St. 9 (1873).
The statutes of the different States vary greatly, sonic being much
broader than others. In many cases, therefore, apparently conflicting
decisions can be reconciled. In some States the statute expressly declares that the husband shall not be liable for the torts of his wife,
unless he directed or participated in them. Vocht v. Kuklenee, i19 Pa.
Where the slander is
365 (t888); Story v. Downey, 62 Vt. 243 (89o).
uttered in the presence of the husband and with his connivance, he,
alone, is liable and must be sued alone. But where it is uttered in his
absence or without his knowledge or consent, the wife is also liable,
and they must be jointly sued, as in our principal case. Baker v. Young,
44 Ill. 42 (1867) ; Nolan v. Traber,49 Md. 460 (x878).
NEGLIGENCE.
Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., io6 Pac. Rep, 337 (igio). The defendant negligently delivered to a merchant, who had ordered a certain
kind of kerosene that would stand an open-fire test of
in a tank marked as containing the article

i2o degrees,
test of only 88
ordered, a distillate that would stand a contract'and
the
on his
degrees. The merchant, relying
as the
intestate,
label, sold some of it to the plaintiff's
article ordered, and she, while trying to kindle a fire with
it, without negligence (qucre, if a domestic can kindle a fire with kerosene without negligence), was killed by an explosion which resulted.
McBride, J., taking judicial notice of the dangerous character of the
distillate, and deciding that the defendant's violation of the statute re-

ULabity of

Manufacturer
of Dangerous
Substanc
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quiring the names and grades of distillates to be marked on the receptacles in which they are so!d, and making it a misdemeanor not to do
so, was negligence per se, held that the plaintiff could recover.
Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 1o Fed. 865, considers the
liability of a manufacturer or vendor of an article to a stranger to the
contract of sale for an injury which he sustains from the concealed
defect while he is lawfully applying the article to its intended use, and
lays down the general rule, as expressed in lVinterbottom v. IWright,
io M. & W. 1o9, that recovery must be confined to those who enter into
the contract. But the following exceptions are recognized: (i) An act
of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor, which is eminently dangerous to the life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the
preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy or affect
human life, is actionable by third parties, who suffer from the negligence. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; Norton v. Scwall, io6 Mass.
J43; Bishop v. Wcber, 139 Mass. 411; Dixon v. Bell, s M. & S. i98.
These cases stand upon two principles of law: (a) That everyone is
bound to avoid acts or omissions imminently dangerous to the lives of
others, and (b) that an injury which is the natural and probable result
of an act of negligence is actionable.
An owner's act of negligence which causes injury to one who
(2)
is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an action against the owner.
(3) One who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be
imminently dangerous to life or limb to another wvithout notice of its
qualities, is liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which
might have been reasonably anticipated, whether there were any contractual relations between the parties or not. Langridge v. Let,, 2 M.
& W. 519; 11,'cilington v. Oil Co., io4 M-Jass. 64; Lewis v. Terry, 43 Pac.
398. A note in 57 C. C. A. Reports. 5, cites a number of cases on the
"Liabilities of Manufacturers and Vendors of Injurious Substances or
Dcfective Machinery and Appliances for Injuries to Persons other than
Immediate Vendees," with which Peterson v. Standard Oil Co. is in
accord.
The case of W1atcrs-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselius, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep.
270, held that where B sold coal oil to A and A resold to X, who was
injured by an explosion caused by gasoline in the coal oil, B was liable
therefor.
A full discussion of the principles involved in this case will be
found in 57 Univ. of Pa. Law Review, 563 (i9o8-I9O9).
An interesting case of a class which will often come before the
courts in future, as the automobile comes more and more into use, is
that of Shepherd v. Jacobs, go N. E. (i9io) 393. The
Chiiunfeur the defendant rented an automobile with a licensed driver to
the representative of the Fiat Automobile Co. for his use
.servant of
for two days at the Lowell races in i9gO, and was to
o
Hinr
receive fifty dollars therefor. While the hirer was in
Automoblle
the vehicle, a collision occurred owing to the negligence
of the driver, and the plaintiff's machine was badly wrecked. Suit was
brought, and the owners of the rented car requested the trial judge to
rule that the Fiat Automobile Co. rather than themselves was liable.
An appeal was taken from his refusal to so charge.
The Supreme Court in affirming the decision reviewed the law of
master and servant as applied to the so-called "carriage cases," the
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conclusion of which seems now pretty well established in favor of the
view that the hirer of a vehicle and driver, who exercises no further
control over the latter than a bare authority to direct where he shall
go. does not take the driver into his employ and so does not become
liable for his negligence. Frerkrv. Nicholson, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) n22,
and cases there cited. The Court considered that for all practical purposes the renting of an automobile and driver is the same, in the eye
of the law, as the renting of a carriage. The same authority is exercised over the driver in each case, and the nature of the vehicle itself
should make no difference. Once, therefore, the "control test" to determine the relation of master and servant is adopted, the conclusion of
the Court seems both logical and sound.
In the case of the P. C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hall, go N. .
(Ind.) 498 (wIO), whether the plaintiff could recover for personal
injuries from the railway company, depended upon his
relation to them. Was he a licensee or an invitee?
Inlury to
Licensee
These facts were found by the jury. The plaintiff was
employed by a glass company. Their yard contained a
nnber of sidings connected with the tracks of the defendant. Cars
consigned to the glass company were switched to these sidings to be
unloaded. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was engaged with
others in unloading a car. Further up on the siding were some cars
that had to be hauled away. In order to get them, it was necessary to
take up the car that was being unloaded, pull it out on the main track
with the other cars and then shunt it back by itself. The men unloading
the car were notified. Some got off, others stayed on. Among the
latter was the plaintiff. It was not an unusual thing to stay on during
these switching operations and was permitted by the train crews,
although prohibited by the rules of the road, and was not at all
necessary.
It was in the course of the switching that the plaintiff was injured.
The car in which he was riding was shunted down the track and collided with some other cars. The impact threw him to the floor of the
he was hurt.
car and
The Court held the plaintiff to be a licensee and hence the defendants were not under a duty to take precautions to make it reasonably
safe for him. This conclusion was reached on the ground that it wasno part of the contract of shipment to permit the consignee's servants
to stay on the cars during the switching. Therefore, the plaintiff was
not on the car in the common interest or for the mutual advantage of
himself and the railway, but for his own benefit or pleasure, and was at
best a licensee.
The decision seems sound and the rule announced is the generally
accepted one. See Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan, 182 Ill. 28 (,899)
and cases there cited, and also Mackie Adm'x v. Heywood and Morrill
Rattan Co., 88 111. App. ii9 (x899).
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QUASI CONTRACTS.
The case of Baker v. Courage & Co., L. R. i K. B. (i9o9) 56,
seems to finally lay down a rule in regard to the recovery of money
paid by mistake, on which there has hitherto been considerable conflict of authority. The facts were these:
Demand:
statute of
The plaintiff agreed to sell his hotel and stock to the
Limitatlonst
defendants and brokers were employed to decide the
Recovery of
value of the property. To facilitate matters the defend/doney
Paid
ants loaned the plaintiff £,ooo to pay off a mortgage;
tUderMista.e the money to be taken off the purchase price. The brokers submitted their report showing a balance due the
plaintiff of i900o, which was paid without anyone's noticing that the
loan had not been deducted. This occurred in ,96 and the plaintiff
allowed his money to remain in defendant's hands, drawing out sums
from time to time. In January, igo9, he had a balance due him of
£xooo, which he attempted to draw, but the defendants, having, in going
over some old accounts, just discovered the overpayment, refused to
let him have his money. A suit was brought, and a set-off and counterclaim were put in for the money originally paid by mistake, which action
the plaintiff argued was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The
defendants claimed this defense was worthless, on the ground that
either the statute began to run from the discovery of the mistake, or
else from the accrual of the cause of action, and that demand and
refusal were necessary to supply such cause.
In deciding the case for the plaintiff, the Court distinctly lays down
the following propositions: First, that where money has been paid
through mistake of fact, the Statute of Limitations begins to run from
the moment of payment and not from the discovery of the mistake.
Second, that in cases of mutual mistake the payor may maintain an
action for the recovery of the money at once, without the necessity of
notice to and demand on, the payee. The cause of action is complete
the moment the money is paid.
This decision would seem, therefore, to settle the question of the
necessity of demand, contra to the theory advanced by Mr. Keener in
his book on Quasi Contracts, pp. 140-154, where the whole subject is
elaborately discussed and all the cases bearing on the point cited and
explained,
REAL PROPERTY.
The partieg entered into an agreement to dig a ditch for the purpose of draining their lands, the expense to be borne equally. The
ditch was dug and two years later the appellant stopped
Rovocability
up the ditch on his own land so that the flow of water
of Parol
from the respondent's land was obstructed. In an action
Equitable
to enjoin the obstruction, the Court held that the appelestoppel
lant
was estopped from so obstructing
v. 5tetler, 124 N. W. (1%inn., i9io) t4.the ditch. Munch
A mere parol license to do an act on the land of another passes no
interest in the land, is revocable at the will of the licensor, is a personal privilege and is not assignable. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W.
838; Great Falls Co. v. R.-R., 21 'Mont. 487; Jones, Easements, sec. 69;
25 Cyc. 645; Sheppard, Touchstone, 239; even where the licensee has
expended money in the erection of structures in pursuance of such
authority, Lawrence v. Springer,49 N. J. Eq. 289, and note to this case
in 31 Am. St. 702. where this question is thoroughly reviewed. It, of
course, justifies anything done by the licensee before revocation. In
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REAL PROPERTY (Continued).
some jurisdictions a license may become irrevocable when the licensee
has made improvements or invested capital in reliance upon it. Some
of the cases proceed upon the theory of estoppel in pals, Brantle? v.
Perry, izo Ga. 76o; Joseph v. l'ild, x46 Ind. 249,-45 N. E. 467; Meek
v. Breckcnridge. - Ohio. 642; Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267; 16 Am.
Dec. 5ol ; others upon the theory of part performance of a parol agreement for an easement taking it out of the Statute of Frauds.. But in
such case there must be a complete and sufficient contract founded upon
a valuale consideration, accompanied by part performance clearly referable to the alleged agreement. Van Ilorn v. Clark, s6 N. J. Eq. 476;
St. Louis Co. v. Ferry Co., 112 Ill. 384; Pitzman v. Boyce, ill Mo. 387.
See also, note to Metcalf v. Hart, 31 Am. St. 1z2. In such case the interpretation of the agreement and the intent of the parties is material
Jackson Co. v. P. IV. 6LB. R. R. Co., 4 Del. Ch. io and note.
The doctrine of estoppel as applied to this question has been severely
criticised, Luwrence v.Sprin9ger. sup ra, and, it seems, justly so. The
rule undoubtedly infringes the Statute of Frauds, and also the common
law principle that incorporeal rights lie in grant and can pass only
by deed.
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.
In an action to try title to real estate the plaintiff claimed that the
original owner. being out of possession, conveyed to him, who was in
legal possession of said premises, through the actual
possession of the defendant, to whom he had agreed to
Champerty
and Mainsell the land. The defendant claimed through another
tenance:
deed executed b'ythe original owner at the same time
Conveyance
to one X, who was admittedly out of possession, and
by Owner
while Out of who later conveyed to the defendant. This deed was
Possession of prior in point of time. as it was delivered first. It was
Land
held that the deed through which the defendant claimed
was void as against the plaintiff, who was in possession,
being made by the owner, while out of possession and hence
champertous. Burke v. Scharf, x24 N. W. (N. D.) 79 (i9io).
This doctrine was well established at common law and arose out of
the inequality of society in England. A conveyance by an owner, while
out of possession, was held to pass no more than a right of entry,
which was not assignable, because "under color thereof, pretended titles
might be granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden down
and the weak oppressed." r Co. Litt. 2r4a. The Statute of Henry VIII
laid a severe penalty on such grants, besides rendering them void. The
doctrine was also in accord with the fundamental principles of common
law. An ordinary feoffmnent was void without livery of seisin, and without possession, the owner could not make livery of seisin.
At the present time there is a hopeless confusion among the American jurisdictions on this point. Some under similar statutes have
adopted the English doctrine. Sher-wood v. Barlow, i9Conn. 471 (1849) ;
IWcbb v. Rlindon. xr Wend. 98 (839).
Others hold that the Statute of
Hen. VIII was merely declaratory of the common law and adopt the
same conclusion without the aid of any statutes. Steeple v. Downing,
6o Ind. 478 (1878) ; Burdick v. Burdick, T4
4.
1. 574 (884).
On the
other hand. the doctrine has been expressly done away with in some
States by statute. Lucas v. Piso, 55 Cal. i_-6
(x88o) ; Morgan v. Blewitt,
71 Miss. 409 (if93). And still others have decided that the whole doc-
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CItAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE (Continued).
trine is obsolete and against public policy, and have held such grants
good without the aid of any statute. Stoever v. 11'hitman, 6 Binn. 420
(1814); l',ght v. Meek, 3 Green (Ia.), 472 (1852) ; Cain v. Monroe, 23
Ga. 82 (1857).
It would scem that the doctrine had outlived its usefulness. The
danger of powerful and influential persons buying up disputed or "fighting" titles as a means of oppressing the poor, is practically non-existent.
And where a man is disseised of his land, the law should not add to his
burden by depriving him of the power to sell it. in the jurisdictions
where the rule still obtains, it is a doubtful question whether such a
grant is valid between the parties to the grant on the theory of estoppel
and void only as to the adverse possessor, tantilton v. I1right, 37 N. Y.
SO2 (1868) ; or whether it is absolutely void, unenforceable against the
grantor himself, Wasle v. Mc)Brayer, 3I Ky. 565 (1833). If the former
be the correct rule, the doctrine is of little effect, because the grantee
might sue in the grantor's name, and the only practical result would be
a variation in the form of the remedy. Hamilton v. Wright, supra.
The principal case is peculiar in that the doctrine was not set up
by the defendant. who was in actual possession of the land, as is almost
universally the case. It was set up by the plaintiff in order to establish
his title, which was absolutely bad nnless the doctrine obtained. This,
as the dissenting justice points out, is using the rule affirmatively as a
weapon of offense against the actual possessor, when the only reason
for applying the doctrine is to afford protection to this adverse possessor.

